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Previous research on the nature of the elf-eacept
generally suggests that this particular construct is broad,
stable, and not easily altered. Yet, current practice re-
garding the feedback of information concerning one's intelli-
gence quotient remains restrictive and unresponsive to thi
evidence. Individuals are protected from the knowledge of
their test results ostensibly to prevent harmful effects
upon their self-images. The present study focused on the
impact of learning one's assessed intelligence quotient
upon needs taken from a measure of self-report. It was
predicted that subjects who had received feedback accurately
specifying their intelligence quotients and who had reported
discrepancies between this score and the quotient they had
expected to receive would score no differently from persons
in control groups who had not been given their IQ scores.
The Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale was administered to
twenty-seven college males and fifty college females,
while the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule was admini-
tered to all of these subjects and to an additional control
group of twenty-one. A Hotelling's T
2 
test was performed
to assess differences between the mean raw scores of the
experimental and control groups on ten EPPS scales.
The results of this analysis did not indicate a signi-
ficant alteration in self-concept following IQ feedback.
This occurred even though the feedback was subjectively




OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
The standardized intelligence test is a valuable and
widely used instrument in the professional's repertoire of
psychological services and, as such, yields extensively
quoted results. It is not the intent of this study to
examine the use of those results, but aspects of their
effect upon the self-concepts of the persons to whom they
are reported.
In a preliminary examination of the pertinent litera-
ture, Sattler (1974) acknowledges the issue with the ques-
tion " how is an individual affected by the knowledge of his
own IQ test scores?" (p. 403). Goslin (1967) explores the
implications of this question with more detail and asks
"[does] 'objective' information about an individual's abili-
ties have any special effect on the opinion the individual
holds about himself?" (p. 677) and "[if] the information is
different from the individual's own estimate, what are the
factors that will influence A-hether it will result in a
change in the individual's self image?" (p. 681).
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Before discussing the consequences of intelligence
quotient feedback, the attitudes and beliefs of Americans
toward intelligence tests (and, subsequently, the impact of
intelligence test scores) will be examined. In questioning
a representative sample of 1500 adults, Brim (1965) found
that intelligence tests were considered to be less important
than school or work success as an indication of a person's
abilities, although the majority thought the tests were
accurate. In addition, when a test was viewed as having had
an impact in a respondent's life, the effect tended to be
positive in nature. In explanation of this finding, Brim
suggested that it may be easier to associate taking tests
and positive consequences rather than taking tests and nega-
tive consequences simply because the positive consequences
are generally more concrete, defined occurrences in contrast
to the surrounding events. Conversely, negative consequences
may not be as specific or clear-cut and only perceived
through their absence. Finally, on Brim's questionnaire
the respondents indicated that intelligence tests were seen
as measures of innate capacities as opposed to tests of
skills and conceptualization abilities that have been
learned during the individual's development.
Anastasi (1967) addresses the difficulty concerning
beliefs about IQ tests when she states:
• . . even total scores, referred to appropriate
norms and accompanied by a suitable margin of error,
can be misleading when perceived in terms of prevalent
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misconceptions about the nature of certain tests.
Suppose, for example, that an IQ is regarded as a
broad indicator of the individual's total intelligence,
which is fixed and unchanging and of genetic origin.
Under these circumstances, releasing the IQs of indi-
viduals to teachers, parents, the individuals thr,
selves, or anyone else is likely to have a deletrious
effect on the subsequent developmen': of many children.
(p. 298)
It is pointed out that misperceptions associated with the
tests are further aggravated by the "global connotations"
of the names of the tests when, in fact, the resultant
scores represent a small sample, a composite of several
functions.
Anastasi (1968) proposed guidelines to be followed
in the transmission of information so that the ne.,Lure of
intelligence and IQ tests may be clarified and erroneous
assumptions avoided. First, the concept of intelligence
should be employed in a descriptive capacity as opposed to
an explanation for the manifestation of certain behaviors.
Secondly, it should be carefully explained to the exami
nee
that the IQ is not fixed and unchanging and that through
intervention there is a possibility of modification. 
Last-
ly, the belief that an IQ is a measure of a "single, unitary
ability" must be overcome. Until these factors are made
widely known, and the myths refuted, there will continue
to be the possibility of misperceptions and inappropriate
actions taken on the basis of intelligence test feedback.
1
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Before stating the problem under consideration in this
work, an additional variable, self-concept, must be briefly
discussed and defined. In an article by Calhoun and Morse
(1977), the terms self-concept and self-esteem are delineated
and a plethora of definitions are presented in an attempt
at clarification. Early researchers in self-theory included
James (1890), Cooley (1902), Freud (1920), and Mead (1934),
although the term "self-concept" is generally credited to
Raimy (1943) while working at the University of Ohio under
Carl Rogers. With these investigations naturally arose
differing views on the construct and, consequently, differ-
ing definitions and measures.
For the purposes of this investigation, the interpre-
tation of self-concept that has been adopted is a composite
of the more applicable parts of several broad definitions.
Webster and Sobieszek (1974) suggest that self-concept
refers simply to "who an individual thinks he is and the
unique traits he believes himself to possess" (p. 7). In
his 1967 publication, Jourard delineates the self-concept
as being one of three integral parts of the "self-structure"
or more broadly, "everything that a person can say about his
own experiencing" (p. 161). Specifically according to
Jourard the self-concept is the person's beliefs about him-
self and conclusions about his characteristic reaction pat-
terns to circumstances encountered in everyday life. He
further postulates that although these beliefs are not
entirely defined and categorized, they may be fairly easily
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and accurately tapped by merely asking the person to de-
scribe himself. This description may be in the form of a
personality inventory in which the person is asked to choose
statements that most correctly describe himself and his
behavior. Finally, Rogers (1951a) discusses the elements
of self-concept and, in addition to one's perceptions of
abilities, describes the "self in relation to others and
the environment" and "value qualities which are perceived
as associated with experience and objects" (p. 136). So,
the definition of the construct of self-concept as employed
in this study is made up of the general definitions pre-
viously described and the qualifying elements proposed as
being necessary for more accurate use and generalization of
the results of research.
Review of the Literature
Conclusions of similar research. The basic question
as to whether feedback regarding intelligence test results
has an impact upon subsequent cognition and behavior of the
individual was examined in a study by Goode (1972). He
cited as a cause for the controversy surrounding public
testing the "presumed harmful effects" of feedback and pro-
ceeded to investigate those effects upon a sample of sixth-
grade students.
The specific focal point of Goode's study was the
suggestion that knowledge of intelligence test results may
reduce one's motivation to learn and have deletrious con-
sequences upon subsequent achievement levels. Each of 280
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children was given the self-estimate ranking list (SERL),
specially constructed for that study, and a comparison was
made with their rank on the School and College Ability (SCAT),
a group intelligence test. Feedback was given in one of
three ways: extensive verbal and visual feedback of IQ
test results, a printed profile of scores, or no feedback
at all. The Reading and Mathematics subtests of the STEP
achievement test were administered six weeks later as the
dependent variable, also given was a second form of the SERL.
In the analysis, a determination was made as to whether
ability estimates change after feedback and the results in-
dicated no significant differences for the experimental and
control groups for any level of the independent variable.
This data led Goode to conclude that there is no apparent
basis for the concern over possible harmful effects of
intelligence test feedback and that withholding of intelli-
gence test results for these reasons is unwarranted.
The effects of feedback and factors involved. Eagly
and Acksen (1971) explored the willingness of a person to
accept information, favorable and unfavorable, about himself
and the direction in which the information departs from the
individual's established self-concept. Research discussed
by Steiner (1968) indicated that there is a higher probabi-
lity of accepting favorable information and Eagly (1967)
found more change in subsequent responding when favorable
information about oneself is compared to information about
the performance of others.
Eagly and Acksen concluded that, because of risks to
the self-concept, overestimating one's abilities is dis-
agreeable due to possible social ridicule by others, whereas
underestimating the same abilities produces inconclusive
results - neither clearly positive nor negative. Public
self-evaluation is only seen as a risk when there is the
possibility of evaluation and feedback by others in the
near future thus proving to be a significant factor in the
iiidividual's acceptance of feedback. Eagly and Acksen
hypothesize that the self-concept is affected by evaluation
and feedback when a person expects such evaluation; it
occurs in such a manner that the (a) individual is 'ess
receptive to favorable information than would normally be
expected and (b) little change is noted toward unfavorable
informatior due to the uncertainty of underestimation.
Therefore, expectancy of evaluation and feedback results in
greater receptivity to unfavorable information. Acceptance
and assimilation of an evaluation that differs from one's
own is thought to be a function of: (a) whether the indi-
vidual experiences a raised or lowered self-concept and (b)
whether his was an overestimation or underestimation of his
abilities.
In summary, it was proposed that changes in self-concept
are a function of the expectancies involved in the evaluation,
that is, whether the feedback occurred publicy (with another
person, such as the experimenter, present) or privately and
whether further evaluation will take place to affect the
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perceived accuracy of one's self-evaluation. It was sug-
gested that adoption of a more favorable self-concept can
be facilitated by private evaluative feedback.
The relationship between the person administering the
test and providing feedback and the person taking the test
was the focus of a study by Fisher (1970). She proposed
that if, when discussing the results of the test, the sub-
ject perceived himself to be in the inferior role, assuming
the attitude of "the crazy one, or the hostile one," then
he is, indeed, those people. The variable in question is
not the specific conclusions of testing but the manner in
which the feedback is conducted which affects the subject
in a way that might persuade him to adopt the characteris-
tics, negative or positive, that are being discussed or
experienced during the feedback. She assumes the results
of the test will have an effect on the future behavior of
the examinee, but it is not as much the objective scores
eliciting this effect as the relationship and the
of the examiner.
Raising and lowering self-concept and  confidence fol-
attitude
lowing success or failure. The possibility exists that it
is not feedback itself which results in subsequent change
in personality or behavior but that the feedback may have
the effect of altering an individual's confidence in his
abilities which, in turn, may act to change the subject's
subsequent view of his capabilities. In his dissertation
on the alteration of self-confidence, however, Frank (1974)
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concluded that "...confidence change, or at least a change
in state self-confidence, did not have a pronounced effect
on personality or cognitive performance," (p. 2427). The
conclusions reached by den Broeder (1976) in his study of
success feedback and its effect upon low academic self-
concept were somewhat contradictory to Frank's. In ex-
amining the research, the proposal was made that such
academic success feedback can result in a subsequent in-
crease in the academic self-concept of formerly low self-
concept students with the qualification that "... it is
provided under the proper conditions" (p. 1475). Proper
conditions are defined as providing academic success feed-
back "incrementally as a function of luck." A similar
stance was taken by Ahuja (1974) in his examination of the
effects of positive feedback upon self-esteem. He reported
that the self-approval and self-esteem of the 4th and 5th
grade students used in his study was improved by increasin
g
the frequency and quality of positive feedback given by
teachers.
If IQ feedback that one's intelligence is lower than
expected is perceived by the individual as being somewhat
of a personal failure (and that scoring higher than
expected is perceived as a success), then research on
the subject by N. T. Feather becomes relevant. In 
his
article of 1968, Feather confirmed his prediction that
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subsequent performance was lower following initial failure
than following initial success," (p. 43). He hypothesizes
that initial success on a task may have had a motivational
effect that increased later performance or, in the case of
initial failure, interfered with later performance. This
motivation effect was related to the change in confidence
following uniform success or failure.
A similar study of positive and negative test feedback
was conducted by Callison (1974) and dealt more closely
with the variable of self-concept. When the elementary
school children were given positive feedback on test results,
66% of the group's scores on the self-concept measure also
became more positive. Conversely, 75% of the students
receiving negative test feedback exhibited reduced self-
concept scores. The final analysis of the results in this
case indicated that the increased level of self-concert was
not statistically significant leading the author to conclude
that positive feedback did not change the children's self-
concept but that negative test feedback did result in an
alteration of self-concept, though relatively little.
Callison cited Ludwig and Mahlr (1967) as reporting that
...the disapproval of significant others resulted in a
lowered self-rating," (p. 1238). As a result of her study,
she expanded upon this statement by suggesting that negative
feedback, even from a person with whom there had been no
previous contact, can result in a decrease in self-concept
but that positive feedback failed to produce the hypothesized
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consequences. Callison concluded with the idea that, be-
cause a single instance of negative feedback produced small
yet significant negative results, a series of such encounters
with negative evaluation may have a serious detrimental ef-
fect upon the child's self-concept.
As an explanation for the possibility of variation
between individuals in response to feedback, it is believed
by Weiner 0_970) that success an, failure in all situations
tends to be attributed to one of four factors: ability,
effort, task difficulty, or lk (p. 146). Further, success
and failure, when ascribed internally (to abilitr or effort),
result in greater feelings of self-pride or self-deprecation,
whereas success or failure attributed to external factors
such as task difficulty or luck, rsult in much less self-
enhancement or deprecation. In an extension of this theory,
Iso-Ahola (1976) reported that: "The results supported the
self-enhancement hypothesis in that causal trait attribu-
tions of internal factors were greater following success
than following failure, and trait attributions of task
difficulty were greater under failure than under success,"
(p. 2571). In addition, the tendency was noted by Iso-Ahola
that when the individual experienced what he felt was a
success or received positive feedback following performance
on a task, the attribution for the success was more likely
to be credited to internal factors or traits. However, this
was true only in cases of actual performance of a task (re-
ferred to as "high ego-involvement"). Therefore, if the
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receipt of IQ feedback were to have an effect upon self-
concept, this likelihood would be increased by the subject's
motivation to ascribe success to internal traits.
The role of ego-involvement in the subsequent effect
of feedback upon the recipient was further explored by
Aronson et al (1963) and Zimbardo (1960). They proposed
that "...to understand the effect upon attitudes even one-
self of a persuasive communcation, it is necessary to con-
sider the motivation which the communication arouses and
also outlets for that motivation besides or in addition to
attitude change," (p. 178). Rhine and Severance (1970) in
reviewing these authors , Sherif et al (1965), and Festiger
(1957) reported that there was very little attitude change
for highly ego-involved subjects. Neither credibility of
the source providing feedback nor the discrepancy between
the information (persuasive communication) and the subject's
own attitudes toward himself contributed toward attitude
change. The conclusions reached by Rhine and Severence were:
"Since an individual's personality interpretation or,
presumably, IQ score feedback concerns attitudes that are
highly ego-involving for him, little post-feedback attitude
change should be expected regardless of experimenter prestige
or discrepancy of the personality feedback from that indivi-
dual's own self-concept," (p. 190).
Another variable in receptivity to evaluative feedback
was introduced by Eagly and Whitehead (1972). In their
research, they hypothesized that when a person is given no
choice as to whether he wishes to receive feedback, his
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reaction to that feedback may differ from the response to
information he has chosen to receive and for which he is,
therefore, responsible. The authors assume for the purpose
of their study that unfavorable feedback results in "nega-
tive consequences (e.g. embarrassment, disappointment,
lowered self-concept)" and, as such, the subject is placed
in the situation of being responsible for the things that
harm him. The acceptance of feedback, positive or negative,
is then proposed to result from an interaction effect between
the degree of choice in receiving feedback and the amount
of discrepancy between the feedback and the subject's own
self-concept. It was thought that change would be greater
toward favorable than unfavorable information if the subject
could not refuse the feedback,whereas more receptivity to
the feedback would result from the opportunity to choose to
receive it.
The results of the study of 158 Introductory Psychology
students indicated that "favorable feedback raised self-
evaluations and negative feedback lowered self-evaluation,"
(Eagly and Whitehead, 1972, p. 227). This was qualified,
though, with the finding that choice in receiving feedback
significantly decreased the upward change toward favorable
feedback and showed some tendency to increase the downward
change to unfavorable evaluative information. The conclu-
sions that resulted from the study were as follows: "(a)
that people who are responsible for receiving an outcome are
under more pressure to realign their cognitions if the outcome
14
is negative than if it is positive and (b) that people
avoid lowering their self-concept," (p. 229).
Self-ideal discrepancy, inconsistency, and social 
comparison. Irwin Silverman (1967) in his discussion of
the work of Stotland and Hillmer (1962) reviewed the ten-
dency for subjects with both high and low self-esteems to
restrict their cognitive input to feedback which is con-
gruent to their already established
He proposed
adjusted to
that persons with a low
their environment, have
behavior consistent with that level
consequently, continue in their low
Wylie (1961), in her extensive
view of their functioning.
self-esteem have become
chosen a pattern of
of adjustment, and,
self-evaluation.
review of the literature
on self-concept, reports that subjects attempt to maintain
a consistent, basic self-concept and will, therefore, reject
or defend against any information with which they ere con-
fronted that contradicts this established concept. In
addition to rejecting failure feedback, the theory proposes
that success feedback is likewise abandoned or interpreted
in such a manner so as to fit into the total, long-standing
pattern. Little effect is hypothesized to result, especially
when it is confronted in a single instance.
Attempts to preserve the self-concept may take many
forms, including devaluation of the source of the informa-
tion, placing the blame for failure upon others or external
events, or by increasing behaviors in the past which have
consistently resulted in a raise in self-esteem, (Wylie,
(1960).
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Stotland, Thorley, Thomas, Cohen, and Zander (1957)
hypothesized that general self-esteem was "too enduring a
characteristic" to be altered by failure on a single task.
Another researcher (Sharma, 1956) asserted very general-
ized effects upon the self-esteem by assuming that failure
on tests of "reasoning ability and insight" would result in
an alteration in the total self-esteem as measured by Brown-
fain's test of mostly non-inte]leetual abilities. Because
this study culminated in inconclusive results, support was
only given to the notion that varying personality character-
istics may be associated with willingness to change self-
concept following failure.
In summarizing fifteen studies upon aspects of know-
ledge of failure or success, Wylie (1961) arrived at the
general conclusions discussed below. Subjects will, indeed,
alter their self-evaluations after experimentally induced
success or failure but primarily in the area of the experi-
mental task alone. That is, "global self-regard" exhibJts
the least amount of change following reports of negative or
positive performance in a specific task. Also, in contra-
diction to the findings of some researchers, an increase in
self-ratings following success occurs more frequently than
a decrease in self-ratings after failure.
Wylie indicated the interpretation of the null results
of many studies of self-concept may be questioned and there
is a definite lack of replication even though these results
are consistent with earlier self-concept theory. Finally,
16
Wylie allowed that alterations in self-concept ratings may
be affected by any one of a number of variables.
There is limited evidence to suggest that the following
may be found to be associated with changes in self-
evaluation: S's personality characteristics, such as
his basic, global level of self-regard; S's test
anxiety; the particular characteristics which have
been devalued in the experiment; the degree to which
S values the source of his information and feels the
source is well-informed, (Wylie, 1961, p. 199).
A statement by Rogers appears congruent with those by
Wylie previously discussed: "He may have some experiences
which are inconsistent with this perception of his self ,
but he either denies these experiences to awareness or
symbolizes them in such a way that they are consistent with
his general picture," (Rogers, 1951b, p. 321).
Glenn and Janda, in their 1977 article on the effects
of false personality interpretations upon self-ideal dis-
crepancy, reported that the mechanism employed by individuals
in maintaining a consistent self-image appeared to be selec-
tive attention to the information. Because those subjects
in the "Low Discrepancy" cell in the experiment were more
inclined to accept favorable personality interpretations
and likely to reject neutral and unfavorable ones, the
authors concluded that subjects were only responsive to
information already congruent with their established self-
concept. These results were similar to those reported earlier
17
by Silverman (1964) and Weisberg (1970) and generally
suggested that assimilation of information about oneself is
most easily accomplished for both high and low discrepancy
subjects when that feedback is consistent with the self-
image. Finally, distortion of incoming information was
seen as an additional mechanism in the assimilation of feed-
back data (Glenn and Janda, 1977).
In his book entitled Self-consistency: A Theory of
Personality, Lecky (1961) described the issue of assimilating
discrepant information into one's conception of self. Lecky
believes that the individual must, at once, maintain a con-
sistency between his interpretations and experience and
"organize his interpretations to form a system which is
internally consistent " (p. 155). It is the circumstances
which make their way past defences to the unique experience
of the individual which become significant parts of the
personality and self-concept.
Characteristics of the Edwards Personal Preference
Schedule as a Measure of Self-concept. The Edwards Personal
Preference Schedule (EPPS) itself was designed to eliminate
the social desirability factor in choice decisions by pair-
iny as closely as possible two statements with equivalent
social desirability values. Edwards (1957) states that the
correlation between the matched pairs of statements on the
social desirability variable is .85. For 76% of the state-
ments, their scale seperation on the SD continum is within
this range:and for the remaining pairs, the SD of one state-
ment exceeds the other by .5 scale units. Additionally,
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Kelleher (1958) computed point-biserial correlations between
the EPPS and the Edwards Social Desirability Scale and con-
cluded that "...it was felt that social desirability played
an insignificant role in the item responses on the EPPS "
(p. 100).
A factor analysis of the EPPS was conducted by Edwards,
Abbott, and Klockars (1972) where eleven factors were dis-
covered for which the EPPS had at least one scale which
identified that factor. It was concluded that "... the
EPPS would appear to provide reasonable measures of the 11
factors obtained in this study " (p. 29). For a more com-
plete discussion of the factor analysis and resultant data,
refer to Edwards, Abbott, and Klockars (1972).
For the purposes of this research, the definition of
self-concept previously adopted (p. 5) specified that a
person's beliefs about himself and his characteristic re-
action patterns could be assessed by asking the person to
describe himself. This technique, termed "self-report,"
often assumes the form of a personality inventory where t
he
individual chooses statements most accurately descriptive of
himself.
Though the EPPS was originally designed for the purpose
of measuring the relative strength of individual needs as
postulated by H. A. Murray (1938), Horrocks (1964) maintains
that the relationship between the two is not firmly estab-
lished. In his research, Horrocks does concede that "
...
intervariable correlations tend to be low, the inte
rnal
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consistency correlations are adequate, and the schedule
does have face validity " (p. 169). However, more recently,
the EPPS has taken on a use as a measure of self-report
Mann (1958) compared the fifteen EPPS variables with a
series of self-ratings on the same variables. He also re-
ported test-retest reliability coefficients which were
slightly lower overall than those reported by Edwards, rang-
ing from .55 on Affiliatio:-! to .87 on Deference, but noted
that this discrepancy was possibly due to a longer interval
between test acl_ministrations (three weeks as opposed to one
week). The data from that study indicated that ten of the
fifteen coefficients between EPPS variables and self-ratings
were significant; this in itself was highly significant.
Mann summarizes by reporting that: "The findings of the
1-Jesent study support the conclusions that: (a) the EPPS
has satisfactory test-retest reliability; (b) the EPPS
correlates with self-ratings on the variables which it
purports to measure; (c) the EPPS does not correlacc.: with
ideal self-ratings on the variables which it purports to
measure " (p. 268). Due to the overall high corretaions
between the EPPS scales and self-ratings, the instrument
is taken to be an acceptable measure of the self-concept as
perceived and reported by the examinee.
Statement of the Problem
The current study was designed to determine the effects,
if any, of intelligence test feedback upon self-concept (as
previously defined and as measured by the Edwards Personal
20
Preference Schedule). Additionally, because the dependent
variable is made up of measures of the relative strength
of ten traits (actually fifteen, but the number was limited
to those traits thought more responsive to IQ feedback and
also for reasons of brevity) the direction of expected change
will be indicated in those traits. The presence or absence
of IQ test feedback is the independent variable with dif-
ferent levels being designated on the basis of the subjective
interpretation of those persons participating in the experi-
ment as to whether their reported IQ was Lower than Expected
(LE), Higher than Expected (HE), or Exactly what Expected
(EE). Two control groups were constructed with which to
compare the levels of the experimental group (Knowledge of
Results - KR). The first was designated the Norm Group
(NG) and was made up of randomly-chosen university students
taking a Freshman History class. The second control group
experienced the test administration and feedback sequence
in reversed order and was, therefore, labelled the Reversed
Feedback group (RF).
Following are the research hypotheses to be investigated:
1. There will be no significant difference in the mean
scores obtained on a standardized measure of personality
variables between the experimental group receiving feed-
back and indicating that their IQs are Higher than
Expected and the group receiving feedback and indica-
ting their IQs are Lower than Expected. This statement
is true for both the male and female samples.
21
2. There will be no significant difference in the
mean scores obtained on the measure of personality
between each of the three levels of the experimental
groups (HE, EE, and LE) and its corresponding control
group - the Norm Group or the Reversed Feedback Group.
3. There will be no significant alteration (increase
or decrease) of the relative strength of the individual
variables. For example, in the experimental group
indicating that their reported IQs are Higher than
Expected, the anticipated direction of change in the
variable (based upon a description of variables found
in the test manual) would be as follows (Appendix A):
Achievement (ach) - increase
Deference (def) - decrease
Exhibition (exh) - increase
Autonomy (aut) - increase
Succorance (suc) - decrease
Dominance (dom) - increase
Abasement (aba) - decrease
Nuturance (nur) - increase
Endurance (end) - increase
Aggression (agg) - increase
Conversely, if the subject indicated that the reported IQ
was Lower than Expected, the anticipated change in the
variable would be in the opposite direction of those shown
above. The group reporting that their IQs were Exactly




The subjects employed in this study were fifty-nine
undergraduate college females and thirty-nine undergraduate
college males who were volunteers attending Introductory
Psychology courses and a Freshman History course. Test
administration and feedback procedures were conducted during
the latter half of the Fall Semester, 1978, and the first
half of the Spring Semester, 1979, at Western Kentucky
University. To preclude the presence of those personality
characteristics sometimes found in volunteers to research
projects and to encourage broader student participation,
the instructors of the psychology classes offered extra
credit in the form of added points to the students' grads.
From the lists of volunteers, names were chosen at
random to be called to schedule appointments for the test
administration. The Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale was
administered to each subject in the experimental group by a
graduate student in either School or Clinical Psychology.
Instruments
The two assessment instruments used in this study were
the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale (1972 Norms Edition)
and the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule. The reasons
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for choosing the Stanford-Binet were two-fold. First, this
test is a widely-known, well-standardized and accepted mea-
sure of the concept of intelligence. A second importantreason for its use was that the Binet yields a single,numerical score (and accompanying nominal _:lassification)of intelligence. It was felt Let, because those people in
the general population who are only vaguely familiar withintelligence measures appear to interpret them as providing
a single, all-encompassing score, any additional subdivisions
of test results might overly complicate the feedback pro-cedure and merely act to significantly confuse the subjects.
As can be seen from the Standard IQ Feedback Form used inthis study (Appendix C), standard errors of the measure areroutinely provided for the reported IQ. If, for example,the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale had been employed, it
would have been necessary to report to each subject not only
this "Full Scale" IQ, but the IQ scores obtained in thesubdivisions of "Verbal" and "Performance." It was believed
that these references accompanied by the appropriate stan-dard errors might overwhelm or confuse the subject and,consequently, reduce the desired impact of the IQ feedback.Therefore, the Binet was seen as the instrument of choice.Because the Stanford-Binet has been extremely well-researched and documented, questions as to its validity andreliability are referred to the very complete discussionsincluded in the test manual (Terman and Merrill, 1973).Although the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule isalso a widely-used assessment instrument, the author felt
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that further explanation and discussion of the nature of
the test was warranted. The EPPS was designed by Allen L.
Edwards and the current edition published by the Psycho-
logical Corporation (copyright 1959). The test itself con-
sists of 225 matched pairs of statements of which the
examinee is instructed to choose the one "more characteristic
of what he likes" (Edwards, 1959).
In the test manual, Edwards (1959) reports both split-
half and test-retest reliability coefficients obtained for
each variable from the 1509 subjects comprising the college
normative sample. The split-half or internal consistency
coefficients range from .60 on Deference to .87 on Hetero-
sexuality. The test-retest or stability coefficients were
obtained from 89 students who took the test on two occasions,
one week apart. These coefficients ranged from a low of
.74 on Achievement and Exhibition to a high of .88 on
Abasement.
To establish the validity of the EPPS, a study was
conducted to determine the correlation coefficients of the
test with the Guilford-Martin Personnel Inventory (G-MPI)
and the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (TMAS). According
to Edwards (1959), the results indicated that "these
correlations are, in general, in the expected directions...
(p. 22). Correlations significant at the five percent
level occurred between the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale
and the Succorance (.22) and Endurance (-22) scales of the
EPPS. On the G-MPI, the subscale entitled Cooperativeness
ft
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was correlated significantly in the expected direction with
four of the EPPS scales. The G-MPI subscales of Agreeable-
ness and Objectivity achieved significant correlations with
eleven and two EPPS scales, respectively.
Procedure
The subjects for this experiment were contacted indi-
vidually by the School or Clinical Psychology graduate
students who were to administer the Stanford-Binet Intelli-
gence Scale and the dependent variable measure. In addition
to the EPPS, the subjects were asked to complete the Academic
Choices Questionnaire following the IQ test. The results
of that study were reported in a seperate research paper
(Piispanen, 1979).
At the beginning of the first testing session, the
subjects were asked to read and sign an "Informed Consent"
form (see Appendix B). Also on this form were provisions
for the subjects to estimate their IQs based upon previous
information that they had or upon their personal opinions
of their abilities. The Stanford-Binet was then administered
in its standard form. Following the initial session, a
feedback appointment was arranged and the time was recorded
in a scheduling book. In this scheduling book the author
would randomly choose subjects to be included in the reversed
feedback group and indicate this beside their appointment
times.
The feedback sessions were conducted in one of two
ways. Those subjects in the KR group were given a standard
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intelligence test feedback form used with IQ tests admini-stered in the Psychological Clinic at Western KentuckyUniversity (see Appendix C). On this form, the subjectswere made aware of their level of intellectual functioningfrom a variety of reference points (actual IQ test scorewith appropriate standard errors of the measure, classifi-cation, percentile rank) in addition to a judgement of thequality of the testing environment. In effect, they werenot merely told a simple score but were provided an accurateand extensive explanation of their current level of intel-lectual functioning based upon the Stanford-Binet.
Immediately after the feedback session (which usuallylasted about fifteen minutes), the subjects were taken toa room down the hall where they completed the EPPS andAcademic Choices Questionnaire.
When the graduate student checked the scheduling bookand found the author had indicated that the upcoming feed-back was to be reversed, the procedure was altered and notedon that subject's Binet protocol. In this case, the subjectwas first administered the EPPS and ACQ, and then given thestandard IQ test feedback. Therefore, the experimental (KR)and reversed feedback (RF) groups experienced identical testsessions only in slightly altered sequence.
To obtain the norm group sample, the EPPS was admini-stered to twenty-five students enrolled in an introductory-level history class. Feedback as to their EPPS scores wasprovided at a later date.
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Each EPPS protocol was handscored and marked at the
top with that individual's actual IQ score, his prior esti-
mate of his score, and his subjective judgment as to whether
the true score was Higher than Expected, Lower than Expected,
or Exactly what Expected. Based upon the subject's sex and
subjective interpretation of the scores, the data were
divided into lcvels for analysis. The raw scores for each
variable, as opposed to percentiles or standard scores, were
used in the analysis.
Design 
In this study, a posttest-only control group design
(Campbell and Stanley, 1963) was employed. Randomization
was used in the selection of subjects from the lists of
volunteers and in the assignment to experimental or control
groups. This was done in an atl:empt to reduce initial biases
between groups. Because Edwards, in the manual for the EPPS,
illustrated that there had occurred significant differences
between male and female scores for the same variable (Ed-
wards, 1959), the experimental, control, and norm
samples were divided based upon the sex of the subjec,..
Additionally, the experimental group was broken down into
three levels of the independent variable for each sex. As
noted earlier, placement in one of these three levels, Lower
than Expected (LE), Higher than Expected (HE), or Exactly
what Expected (EE), was based upon the subjective judgment
of the individual participant upon receipt of his intelli-
gence test feedback. This placement into subgroup enacted
28
by the subject and based upon his personal interpretation
of the standardized IQ feedback became the independent
variable. The dependent variable, measure of self-concept,
was the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule - specifically,
ten out of the original fifteen personality variables (see
Appendix A).
In addition to the experimental croup (KR) with its
six levels (three for male, three for female), there were
two control groups, each broken down only according to sex.
The first control group most closely approximated the experi-
mental group, differing only in the sequence of test feed-
back. The experimental group was told the results of their
IQ test prior to administration of the EPPS while the first
control group was administered the EPPS and were informed
of their scores immediately following. For this reason,
the control group was labelled Reversed Feedback or RF.
Tc achieve a wider sample of norms with which the ex-
perimental group could be compared, the EPPS was administered
to a Freshman History class. Because this class was required,
it was thought that a more representative sample of the
responding of university students might be gained. The
resulting scores were used as the second control group, the
Norm Group or NG. For the mean scores on the EPPS variables
of the KR, RF, and NG groups, refer to Table 1.
The EPPS provides a Consistency Score which allows the
examiner to check for random responding and, consequently,
possible invalid profiles. As a precaution that the subjects
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were not making choices by chance alone, a score of 10 was
used as a cutoff point. The probability of 10 or more
identical choices occurring by chance is approximately .15
(Ee,.15) (Edwards, 1959). Therefore, due to the elimination
of incomplete protocols and those with unsatisfactory Con-
sistency Scores, the sample sizes actually used in this
study were as follows:
Knowledge of Results: 56 (16 males, 40 females)
Reversed Feedback: 21 (11 males, 10 females)
Norm Group: 21 (12 males, 9 females)
Below are listed the mean ages for each group of sub-
jects:
Experimental Group (KR): Males 20.0 years
Females 19.1
Reversed Feedback (RF): Males 18.7
Females 18.5
"History" Norm Group (NG): Males 19.3
Females 18.9
Statistical Treatment of the Data
The simplest statistic appropriate to measure possible
differences between two group means is the t test. However,
because of the nature of the scores resulting from the EPPS,
a simple t test was not appropriate. The EPPS does not
yield a score descriptive of the absolute strength of each
variable but instead assesses the relative strength of
each of these needs in comparison to the others as they
manifest themselves in the respondent's personality. With
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this restriction, it was necessary to use Hotelling's T2
test for the equality of means which only requires th
at the
populations have multivariate normal distributions. 
Thus,
it was possible to compare not one variable with its 
cor-
responding score in the control group, but the relative
strength of all ten variables simultaneously and comp
are
the resultant value with the appropriate control. The
results of this group comparison yielded an F statistic
which, when tabled for the appropriate degrees of freed
om,
was used to determine the possible significant differ
ences
between the groups of variables. If the F statistic was
equal to or less than a probability of .05 (E.05), th
e
group differences were considered significant and a s
imple
t test would be employed to determine which individual
scales contributed to the difference.
Chapter III
RESULTS
The purpose of this study was to investigate the
effects, if any, of knowledge of IQ test results upon self-
concept as measured by the Edwards Personal Preference
Schedule. Three null hypotheses were proposed: (a) that
there would be no significant difference in the mean scores
between the experimental group receiving IQ feedback and
indicating that their IQs were Higher than Expected and the
group receiving feedback and indicating that their IQs were
Lower than Expected, (b) that there would be no significant
difference in the mean scores between each of the three
levels of the independ2nt variable (HE, LE, and EE) and its
corresponding control group, and (c) that there would be no
significant alteration (increase or decrease) in the rela-
tive strength of the individual EPPS scales across groups.
In the event of non-significant results in the fir-4
cases, the third null hypothesis (c) would not be tested.
Means for all groups were computed so that sLatistical
comparisons could be made between the levels of the experi-
mental group and the control groups (see Table 1).
The null hypotheses were accepted since none 7-1: r
ratios for the appropriate df were found to be significant
(E< 05) (see Table 2). The analysis would indicate that
31
32
knowledge of one's IQ test results has no effect upon self-
concept as assessed by the personality variables of the
EPPS. The results were similarly nonsignificant for both
male and female subjects and across all levels of the
independent variable. Because of the nonsignificant F in
each comparison, the Hotelling's T
2 
value would have neces-
sarily been nonsignificant but was computed as part of the
analysis. Further breakdown for variable significance
was not performed.
Due to small sample size, the assumptions for the use
of the F ratio could not be met in the comparison of LE and








Reversed Group Norm Group
Males
Exact H'•her Lower
Males Females Males Females
achievement 17.50 16.29 14.86 13.88 13.57 13.96
16.45 14.60 15.17 12.57
deference 15.00 10.29 13.00 8.13 11.00 10
.72 11.91 8.60 10.50 10.56
exhibition 12.50 15.43 12.71 14.88 14.14
15.04 12.82 15.00 13.08 15.67
autonomy 14.00 12.86 14.14 13.38 13.00
12.04 12.82 13.50 13.25 15.44
succorance 9.50 13.43 8.43 14.00 11.29
13.56 12.82 14.30 15.50 12.67
dominance 11.00 15.57 9.71 13.50 12.57
11.88 13.45 12.00 12.50 12.33
abasement 18.50 12.71 17.14 15.13 18.00
15.24 15.18 17.00 13.42 13.22
nurturance 11.50 18.14 18.43 14.38 18.29
16.72 19.55 17.90 15.08 19.22
endurance 16.00 11.00 15.71 12.63 14.00
13.92 12.82 12.10 14.00 9.77
aggression 8.50 10.43 9.43 13.75 10.29
10.20 10.27 10.20 11.58 12.33
n size for =
each group
2 7 7 8 :7 25
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EE 0.82 (10,7) 0.75 (10,8)
17.29 54.12






EXPERIMENTAL GROUP: T2 = 15.94a 56.81




EE 0.38 (10,6) 0.80 (10,5)
9.76 12.77
HE 0.71 (10,24) 0.92 (10,23)
Note: aHotelling's T2 Value
bObtained F Value
cDegrees of Freedom (df)
Chapter IV
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The results of this study are not considered to be at
variance with the majority of past and current research on
the self-concept and its resistance to change. In analyzing
the data and considering the results in light of the perti-
nent literature, it was found that the self-concept is a
relatively stable and enduring construct. As such, it is
believed that the procedure of reporting an individual's
true intelligence quotient, replete with a detailed descrip-
tion of his performance in relation to others in his age
group, will not, in the majority of instances, result in a
significant alteration in that person's cognitions of his
self or his personal characteristics. Therefore, the author
concurs with Goode's (1972) conclusions that there exists
no apparent basis c(7icern over the harmful effects of
IQ test feedback / an, , not generally necessai to with-
nold individual's sccre3 for fear oedeletios ccnsequences.
It is theorized that the add.. on 'ntrus:Len) of a
single, relatively small bit of information concel—ng one's
abilities does not carrv thc ...eight necessary to significantly
alter one's existing, well-entrenched beliefs. As with the
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population sampled, the subjects had on the average of
twenty years' confirmation of their standings among their
peers in the areas of intellectual status, perceptual-motor
skills, memory, and fund of information. It is felt that
intervention not totaling more than two hours would be
unlikely to persuade an individual to alter these conceptions.
This conclusion would appear true despite the examiner's
perceived status as an "expert."
As with Wylie's (1961) contention, the results of this
research indicated that subjects tend to maintain a basic
consistent self-concept through tasks. Rejection or defense
against intrusion of discrepant information, especially the
occurrence of a single instance, appeared to be the norm.
According to Eagly and Acksen (1971), the situation most
conducive to long-term personality change as a result of
this type of feedback would necessarily have to occur in a
private feedback mode. Additionally, in the event that
change did occur, it would be slightly greater toward favor-
able rather than unfavorable information, especially if the
subject had made the conscious decision to enter the feed-
back situation and was responsible himself for receiving
that information (Eagly and Whitehead, 1972). The hypotheses
in this case would be that, since the subjects volunteered
to participate in the study and actively engaged in the tasks
required to the extent of returning for the feedback, they
would be under additional pressure to re-align their cogni-
tions in response to the data presented. Such was not the
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case, however. Though the subjects met the stipulations of
the hypothesis according to Eagly and Whitehead, no signifi-
cant change became apparent.
The present study intended to assess changes in self-
concept as a function of feedback discrepant to the indivi-
dual's existing view of his personal characteristics. Wylie
(1961) would have anticipated no change in the assessment of
"global self-regard." However, if the personal characteris-
tics measured had been directly and closely related to the
construct of intelligence, some change in the person's
perceptions of his abilities and expectancies of his level
of functioning might have been anticipated. Feedback was
offered regarding a single, though weighty, aspect of that
person's being and dependent measures of the broadest kind
were instituted in an attempt to assess the effects.
Possible sources of contamination have been proposed.
It was initially noticed that subjects generally refrained
from placing their estimates of intellectual functioning in
the Lower than Expected group. It is possible that the
participants did not wish to admit a feeling of failure or
disappointment and, therefore, expressed the attitude that
this IQ feedback was higher than they expected. This may
have been an attempt to "save face in front of the examiner.
Present procedure in most of our schools and learning
institutes dictates that the results of intelligence tests
be withheld from the scrutiny of students and, in a pure
form, from their parents also. This study, though it employed
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only college students, added further support to the litera-
ture which suggests that this secrecy is not entirely justi-
fied. It would appear that we have been overly cautious in
reporting IQ scores, possibly to the point of developing
myths regarding the vast capabilities inherent in intelli-
gence tests. The IQ simply fails to live up to its image
as the burdenous indicator and academic and vocational
determinant which, once discovered, is the primary influence
in personal and social decision-making. The populace appears
to take it with a grain of salt. This leaves educators and
psychological theorists to debate the potential good any IQ
score serves in tailoring educational programs and the poten-
tial harm if released to the subject.
This conclusion must be tempered, though, in light of
the limited sample from which the data was taken and the
interpretations made. The circumstances examined were
necessarily restricted, in this case to a specified strata
of a college population, and judgments or generalizations
to the entire field of test feedback would be inappropriate.
An additional factor to be taken into consideration in draw-
ing conclusions is the short time lapse between feedback 
alAd
assessment by the dependent variable. Perhaps more signifi-
cant changes actually do occur following feedback but requir
e
more time to ferment and build to the proportions necessary
to alter self-concept. If this is the case, a follow-up
study at a later date might, indeed, detect changes in self-
concept that appear directly attributable to intelligence
test feedback.
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It is not advocated that exact scores be released rou-
tinely to the test-taker but that the over-concern for the
stability of a person's self-concept be relaxed to the point
of enabling an open, uncomplicated exchange of information.
As opposed to training in methods of maintaining a closed
file on a person's measured intelligence, more wise and,
ultimately, more beneficial procedures might be found. Per-
haps a desirable alternative would entail researching and
promoting effective, empathic methods of reporting intelli-
gence test results to examinees. instead of making decisions
about students' futures based upon information gleened from
them with an aura of mystery, feedback procedures might be
developed to help explain the information honestly and
clearly. An attempt should be made to help the subject
understand the material so that he may participate in the
academic decision-making process himself. It is anticipated
that the positive consequences of IQ feedback in which the
student is a respected, trusted participant would far out-
weigh the probability of damage to the self-concept through
release of act S
The adveh, - of completely revised dback procedures
would necessi_ate research into the mot af.prcpliate methods
of reporting information and eealin. with .:Llbjects' responses.
It is proposed that those persons dealin:,, with. aaterial con-
cerning importc,ne ,-?eets of other's personalities (particu-
larly IQ) receive, as part of their formal training, instruction
on the reporting of results back to the examinees. In any
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event, the withholding of intelligence test scores for the
purpose of protecting the individual's self-perceptions and
total self-concept is considered generally unnecessary.
Further research, then, might entail comparisons of
several forms of feedback procedures (and no feedback at all)
to determine the ultimate effect of each upon self-concept.
Several changes in procedure would be recommended in a
replication of this research. First, an attempt should be
made to employ cell sizes of an equal number to permit more
valic, comparison. Secondly, it is believed that the use of
a pre-test, post-test design or, possible, a single measure
plit into two equivalent halves with half administered
before intervention and half after would be more appropriate.
Results of a relatively small sample of subjects compared
with a norm group after intervention has taken place may be
suspect. Before and after measures would be anticipated to
be more sensitive to individual changes.
If specific effects of IQ feedback are sought, perhaps
a measure of one's attitudes toward abilities on intellectual
and academic tasks would be most appropriate. However, if it
is still the general, "global" effects of IQ feedback which
are of interest, a measure of self-concept with independent
scales purporting to .neasure "who an individual thinks he
is and the unique traits he believes himself to possess"
(Webster and Sobieszek, p. 7) would be effective. An
adjective checklist specifically constructed for the study
is another alternative.
41
In summary, it would seem from this study and a review
of the research that the self-concept as assessed by mea-
sures of self-report is much more resistant to substantial
and permanent alteration when presented with new data than
generally suspected. Even when the information presented
is clearly discrepant from earlier personal assumptions,
the self-concept proves heartingly that it is capable of
enduring and assimilating the data. Even the controversial
intelligence quotient actually results in relatively minor
or short-term changes, if any.
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Appendix A
The Manifest Needs Associated with Each of the 10 EPPS
Variables Used in this Study
ach Achievement: To do one's best, to be successful, to
accomplish tasks requiring skill and effort, to be a recog-
nized authority, to accomplish something of great signifi-
cance, to do a difficult job well, to solve difficult
problems and puzzles, to be able to do things better than
others, to write a great novel or play.
def Deference: To get suggestions from others, to find out
what others think, to follow instructions and do what is
expected, to praise others, to tell others that they have
done a good job, to accept the leadership of others, to
read about great men, to conform to custom and avoid the
unconventional, to let others make decisions.
exh Exhibition: To say witty and clever things, to tell
amusing jokes and stories, to talk about personal adventures
and experiences, to have others notice and comment upon
one's appearance, to say things just to see what effect it
will have on others, to talk about personal achievements,
to be the center of attention, to use words that others do
not know the meaning of, to ask questions others cannot
answer.
aut Autonamv: To be able to come and go as desired, to say
what one thinks about things, to be independent of others
in making decisions, to feel free to do what one wants, to
do things that are unconventional, to avoid situations where
one is expected to conform, to do things without regard to
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what others may think, to criticize those in positions of
authority, to avoid responsibilities and obligations.
Suc Succorance: To have others provide help when in trou-
ble, to seek encouragement from others, to have others be
kindly, to have others be sympathetic and understanding
about personal problems, to receive
tion from others, to have others do
be helped by others when depressed,
sorry when one is
hurt.
dom Dominance: To argue for one's point of view, to be a
a great deal of affec-
favors cheerfully, to
to have others feel
sick, to have a fuss made over one when
leader ill groups to which one belongs, to be regarded by
others as a leader, to be elected or appointed chairman of
committees, to make group decisions, to settle arguments
and disputes between others, to persuade and influence
others to do what one wants, to supervise and direct the
actions of others, to tell others how to do their jobs.
aba Abasement: To feel guilty when one does something
wrong, to accept blame when things do not go right, to feel
that personal pain and misery suffered does more good than
harm, to feel the need for punishment for wrong doing, to
feel better when giving in and avoiding a fight than when
having one's own way, to feel the need for confession of
errors, to feel depressed by inability to handle situations,
to feel timid in the presence of superiors, to feel inferior
to others in most respects.
nur Nurtrance: To help friends when they are in trouble,
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to assist others less fortunate, to treat others with kind-
ness and sympathy, to forgive others, to do small favors
for others, to be generous with others, to sympathize with
others who are hurt or sick, to show a great deal of affec-
tion toward others, to have others confide in one about
personal problems.
end Endurance: To keep at a job until it is finished, to
complete any job undertaken, to work hard at a task, to
keep at a puzzle or problem until it is solved, to work at
a single job before taking on others, to stay up late work-
ing in order to get a job done, to put in long hours of
work without distraction, to stick at a problem even though
it may seem as if no progress is being made, to avoid being
interrupted while at work.
agg Aggression: To attack contrary points of view, to tell
others what one thinks about them, to criticize others
publicly, to make fun of others, to tell others off when
disagreeing with them, to get revenge for insults, to be-
come angry, to blame others when things go wrong, to read
,Iewspaper iccounts of -Tiolence. (Edwards, 1959)
Appendix B
INFORMED CONCENT
You are about to take an intelligence test which is widely
used by psychologists. The purpose of this testing session
is practice for the psychologist-in-training in administer-
ing this test. We will be happy to share the results with
you. The results of this test will be seen by the instruc-
tor in the course and by other psychologists-in-training.
The name of the psychologist-in-training who will administer
the test and provide feedback is
Signature
Social Security Number
52 68 84 100 116 132 148
The above "normal" curve is a representation of how the
scores from this intelligence test would be distributed if
everyone in the general population were to take it. The
average score is 100 with the majority of people (approxi-
mately 68% of the population) receiving scores between 84
and 116. With this in mind, which of the ranges of IQs
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BOWLING GREEN, KENTUCKY 42101
Name Date of Test
Examiner
The Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale was given as an
assessment of current level of intellectual functioning.
The estimate of intellectual functioning which was obtained
would classify him/her as when compared to
the U. S. population.
Based upon the score of which was obtained on this par-
ticular administration of the Stanford-Binet, it would be
expected that a true score would fall within the range of
from to  68% of the time on repeated administrations
of the test and from  to 95% of the times. A score
in this range would exceed % of the general population.
An examination of performance on the various items which
make up the tests would suggest that 
is a strength and that
is possibly an area of weakness.
The testing environment would be classified as 
and these results should be considered as 




Subjective Interpretation of IQ
 Feedback
Where does the estimate of your IQ
 you have just been given
fall in relation to the score you
 expected to receive?
Based upon your feelings, place 
an
point on the line below.
11X111 at the appropriate
"This estimate was than I
 expected."
Much Slightly Exactly 
Slightly Much
Loier Lower What I Eixpect
ed Hi her Higher
Name
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